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ABSTRACT 
The state and the market have long been recognized as the key modes 
of social organization underpinning democratic society. However, the 
failure of these governance modes to solve complex public problems 
meant that new ways of working had to be devised. As a result, 
networks and the network governance mode have come to the fore.  
While inextricably inter-related, each of these three modes is 
underpinned by differing operating frameworks which are grounded in 
contrasting rule systems, moral orders and rationales and each requires 
different actors, institutional arrangements and strategies.  
As a result of adopting and utilizing these differing approaches, the 
current policy arena is comprised of aspects of all three governance 
modes. However, not only do these modes stand alone, they often 
appear in cross-cutting, hybrid governance forms. This situation leads 
to governance complexity and what is contended to be a “crowded” 
policy domain in which differing governance arrangements, policy 
prescriptions, participants and processes bump up against and even 
compete with each other to cause overlap and confusion and, 
potentially erode the potential for positive service delivery and 
programme outcomes.  
This paper argues therefore that policy and decision-makers need to 
recognise the difference between these modes, select optimal mixes 
and their associated components in order to create the space necessary 
for more meaningful dialogue and interaction to occur between the 
most favourable elements. It is contended that what is required is an 
ability to effectively isolate, select and, mix and match governance 
aspects of each of the three modes and thereby orchestrate the varying, 
and often competing, elements of these modes residing in the policy 
domain into harmonious collective action. The paper proceeds by 
tracing the evolution of the expanded mix, sets out a coherent 
framework to aid decision-making and explores the challenges faced 
by governments in balancing the structural and operational 
mechanisms necessary to sustain the engagement of such a diverse set 
of players.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Each of the three primary modes of social organization—the state, the 
market and networks—represents alternative ways of organizing 
society and is underpinned by a set of ideological assumptions and 
principles that guide its operation and optimal operating conditions. 
Under the state mode, hierarchy and “legitimate” authority provide the 
means to regulate relationships between actors.  By contrast, the 
market mode relies on price signals and formalized, legal contractual 
relations to bring dispersed suppliers and purchasers together. Finally, 
the network mode relies on exchange relationships based on trust and 
reciprocity as a way of forging collective action. Each institutional 
arrangement and corresponding governance mode is considered 
optimal for different economic, social and political circumstances 
(Colebatch & Lamour, 1993; Scott, 1981). 
Confronted by the complexity of the environment in which major 
policy initiatives are being implemented, the sharp definitions of these 
“ideal” forms have become blurred as they have given way to or sit 
alongside more variegated or hybrid modes in which the elements of 
the state, market and increasingly networks are continually being 
configured and reconfigured.  
These remixes or hybrid arrangements reflect a new interest in flexible 
arrangements that retain some of the virtues of the state such as 
accountability and transparency and the efficiency and quality aspects 
of the market and yet may be underscored by interpersonal networks 
of trust, reciprocal relationships and shared responsibilities. In effect, 
public policy making and delivery is being shaped by new and 
variegated organizational and structural configurations that range from 
partnerships, alliances, networks, strategic collaborations and service 
clusters (Mandell, 2000; Mandell and Steelman, 2003) in which any 
particular set of organizational arrangements may be associated with a 
variety of modes of governance (Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998). As 
Bardach and Eccles (1991) expand, these new arrangements are often 
mixed and as a result, the market signal of price and the state authority 
structure is intermingled with trust that emanates from a focus on 
relationships and networks.  
It has been argued that the effect of introducing new governance 
modes to policy development and service delivery has been a 
“crowding” of the policy arena or space (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984). 
That is, each mode brings with it additional actors, new processes and 
mechanisms as well as alternative values and goals that have to be 
considered and accommodated.  This condition of crowding was first 
observed during the 1980s when the service range of many western 
governments expanded, bringing in new service fields and a wider 
array of policy actors, all of which required  expanded coordination 
processes (Painter, 1987).  
The current more formalised and deliberate inclusion of the 
community in the governance  mix adds new and more complicated 
sets of considerations in relation to policy and decision-making and, 
service delivery. Issues arising from these new interactions include 
government no longer being in the “driver’s seat”, the community 
being required to actively be a partner rather than just the recipient of 
funding, the need for new adaptations to these changes and the 
requirement for new terms of engagement by the different actors.  In 
particular the inclusion of community representatives will result in a 
extension of the number and diversity of participants or stakeholders. 
The differing ideologies and goals between these new and existing 
players requires more detailed negotiation to achieve agreed outcomes 
and a recognition of a shift in power dynamics.   
Together, these factors necessitate an adjustment in expectations for 
interactions. For example,  communities are required to take a more 
active role in problem-solving, including making decisions on 
innovative ways of working that may lead to systems change. At the 
same time, governments need to learn to share power and be more 
flexible in their controlling mechanisms. Moreover, the existence of 
plural governance modes, the overlaying of “old” institutions, 
processes and actors with new arrangements leads to a crowded and 
even contested institutional arena, creating a sense of fragmentation 
which can prevent good policy and service outcomes. Or as Skelcher 
(2000, p. 12) notes “require the application of significant resources to 
negotiate the development and delivery of public programmes”. The 
inclusion of the community brings not just more actors into the 
governance mix, but arrays the institutional arena in ways that defy 
traditional operating principles.   
The community in the new institutional mix 
The practice of institutional mixing is not new. Indeed, many western 
democratic countries have long engaged in a “mixed economy model” 
of development and service delivery in which predominantly the 
institutions of the state and the market interacted to provide public 
goods and services (Beresford, 2000; Crawford, 1996;  Yergin & 
Stanislaw, 1998). This approach is explained by Quiggin (1999, p. 
40), “The mixed economy involved large-scale government 
involvement in an economy that was nevertheless predominantly 
private.”  
Although within this mix, the community and “community-based” 
services were often  primary providers of public services,  their 
contribution was often officially overlooked (Chanan, 1997; Osborne 
& McLaughlan, 2003; Brown & Keast, 2005) or was cast in the minor 
support role of “safety- net” (Saunders, 1998), “gap-filler” (Seibel & 
Anheier, 1990) or “watch-dog” (Ryan, 1998).  Increasingly however, 
governments are looking to move beyond the utilization of community 
as a “service gap filler”, to capitalize on the networks and social 
capital located in communities as a way of enhancing policy 
development and implementation.     
This shift is based on the increasing realization that governments are 
not the sole repositories of information or expertise and that actors 
outside of government and the traditional interest groups are able to 
contribute to enhanced policy development and implementation, 
particularly where this applies to local issues (Kickert, Klijn & 
Koppenjan, 1997). Government engagement within networks would 
fulfil the important purpose of co-opting specialist knowledge into the 
policy process (Jordan & Richardson, 1983). Further, in bringing 
together the array of relevant stakeholders—state and non-state (both 
for-profit and not-for-profit)—ongoing links and relationships are 
established that will aid future actions and begin to “join-up” the 
diverse array of human and financial resources and, counteract service 
fragmentation and citizen dislocation.  
As a result, in the current remixing of modes, by including networks 
and the network governance mode, community actors have been 
moved from the peripheral, support role, and are now given a 
legitimate decision-making role (Adams & Hess, 2001; Edwards, 
2001; Brown & Keast, 2005).  Bringing community actors into the 
new institutional mix, means that rather than being in distant arms’ 
length funding relationships with government, they are now poised as 
equal partners alongside other stakeholders. It is this legitimate or 
formal partnering arrangement that deliberately moves the community 
to the centre of the decision-making process. Consequently, in many 
countries (Adams & Hess, 2001; Bowles & Gintis, 2000; Edwards, 
2001; Schwartz, 2001), the community has re-emerged as a critical 
component in the new reconstructed arena of public policy 
development and implementation.  
Several case studies demonstrate the impact of the inclusion of 
community networks and actors in broader policy making and service 
delivery decisions. For instance, in one case study the community was 
made a focal point for developing a comprehensive and integrated 
plan for the locale (Mandell, 2001). By bringing in a broad spectrum 
of community actors, often from outside of the conventional policy 
making arena, it was noted that the process became “messy” at times, 
often bordering on chaos. Whilst this was an uncomfortable situation 
for those in the process who were used to orderly progress through 
agendas and structured decision-making, the new participants through 
their different perspectives and an enthusiasm to forge relationships 
allowed new ideas to emerge and establish practical and effective 
applications for these ideas. Further, the policy makers who were part 
of this group and used to making decisions in a top-down fashion, had 
to learn how to deal with a situation where “everyone is in charge” 
(Mandell, 2001). This case highlights how the inclusion of community 
actors into what otherwise would have been a “closed”, hierarchical 
decision-making environment, extended the participation base and 
required enhanced negotiation processes to accommodate and 
synchronise competing ideologies, goals and agendas.  
This re-casting of community as a key player in the decision-making 
process together with the introduction of network governance forms 
can be linked predominantly to the perceived limitations of the state 
and the market forms of governance and the need for mediating 
arrangements (Considine, 2001).   There is a growing convergence in 
both theory and practice of the need for and benefit of non-state 
actors’ involvement in public policy deliberations and implementation 
together with the appreciation of networks as an integrating 
mechanism for this (Adams & Hess, 2001; Kickert et al.,  1997). The 
focus on networks as an additional governance mode emerges from 
the desire to resolve the identified problems of state and market forms 
of governance.  
STATE AND MARKET LIMITATIONS   
Historically the provision of the bulk of public services has been 
achieved through the institutions of the state, principally in the form of 
a bureaucracy, represented by large and divisionally disaggregated 
departmental entities, driven by rules and procedures, and hierarchical 
authority and restricted communication channels (Considine, 2001; 
Hasenfeld, 1983). This model was successful and efficient at 
producing standardized, universal services that helped to improve the 
life situation and experiences of many citizens (Considine, 2001; 
Crawford, 1996; Quiggin, 1999). 
 However, in the contemporary context in which citizens are 
demanding more integrated, flexible and personalized or community-
specific services as well as greater efficiencies with public funds and 
more voice (Commonwealth Foundation, 1999; Keating, 2000), the 
characteristics of the state institutional framework and the 
predisposition toward rigidity, institutional and service fragmentation, 
and top-down, exclusive rather than inclusive, decision-making have 
been found to be an increasingly inadequate and inappropriate vehicle 
for the delivery of public policy and many public services (Aucoin, 
1993; Beresford, 2000; Doyle, 1999; Head, 1999; Muetzelfeldt, 2001). 
It is also held that an over-reliance on government was a barrier to 
social well-being as it would squeeze out community and personal 
initiative and create dependency (Latham, 1998, 2001; Pearson, 1999; 
Tierney, 1970). In this case there is a preference for less government 
and less interference with citizens in their pursuit of life chances. 
In response to these limitations, several broad-ranging reforms were 
commenced to enhance, reduce and, in some instances, replace 
bureaucracy as the primary instrument of service provision (Barry, 
1987; Hood, 1991). Located under the  label of New Public 
Management (NPM) in which the emphasis was on attaining 
efficiency, effectiveness and economy, initial reforms centered on the 
application of business-like principles and practices such as improved 
budget mechanisms, quality management, performance measures and 
greater emphasis on outputs as opposed to inputs and processes 
(Corbett, 1992). These largely internally-focused and hierarchically 
driven reforms were subsequently combined with the application of 
more entrepreneurial methods to free up management processes 
(Osbourne & Gaebler, 1992), as well as the introduction of market-
based solutions that relied on competition and contestability to drive 
optimal service provision and maximize utility (Osborne & Brown, 
2005).   
Within this broad framework, reform was accomplished through 
separating policy and implementation decisions and actions, splitting 
large, diverse departments so that they focused on core business 
activities, and, increasingly, using contracting and tendering processes 
to assign previously held government tasks and responsibilities to the 
not-for-profit and private sectors. Underpinning strategies included 
options such as compulsory tendering of services on a price 
competitive basis, purchaser–provider splits, corporatization, 
privatization and even the creation of quasi-markets where pure 
markets did not exist as well as various mixed, or hybrid arrangements 
of these (Brown, Ryan & Parker, 2000; Muetzelfeldt, 2001).  
A number of timely, positive and necessary changes were 
implemented as a result of NPM ideas and practices. These alterations 
secured real improvements in the quality of management, important 
changes in the measurement of costs and outcomes, and some 
efficiency savings (Adams & Hess, 2001; 6, Leat, Seltzer & Stoker, 
1999).  These changes also provided the environment in which to 
attempt to implement a number of innovative services or service 
enhancements that were previously constrained by excessive red tape 
and protocol, and fixed-budgetary arrangements.  
However, in terms of social policy objectives, for many social 
commentators and community members, and especially in relation to 
the more vulnerable populations, the assumed gains of competitive 
market models were seen as problematic. Specifically, the interplay of 
the various dimensions of NPM, especially the mix of corporate 
management and market principles, coupled with decentralization and 
continuing government changes and the creation of numerous 
specialized autonomous service agencies that are pitted against each 
other for funds and then formed into alliances, have added to, rather 
than decreased, the policy and service confusion (Williams, 2000) and 
further fragmented an already fractured institutional environment 
(Davis & Rhodes, 2000).  
More generally, with the market emphasis on competition coupled 
with the “supply and demand” and “user pays” ethos, there is a 
concern that the market mode will result in the disappearance of the 
concept of “public interest” as an important rationale and aspect of 
policy-making and implementation and contribute to an undermining 
of social cohesion (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000; Kettl, 2000). The 
strong competitive emphasis of the market mode is also asserted to 
have contributed to undermining community cohesion with citizens 
having to compete against each other for services and, in doing so, 
isolated citizens from their community and their governments. Funnell 
(2001, p. 74) argues these competitive arrangements,  
Have pitted citizens against each other in the 
frantic competition for access to employment, 
justice and health, leaving them feeling betrayed. 
Community disaffection with the ‘benefits of 
economic change’ is reflected in community 
concerns about negative social consequences.  
 
Thus, just like the state mode it was intended to replace or overhaul, 
an over- emphasis on “efficiency and effectiveness”, coupled with the 
inherent fragmentation and uncertainty of the market mode, has, over 
time, resulted in a constituency that is increasingly showing signs of 
disaffection with interactions with government, despite the outcomes 
achieved (Davis, 2001). In relation to the bureaucratic and contractual 
models, de Carvahlo (1998) stated: “Neither of these approaches has 
provided a lasting improvement in the social and economic welfare of 
nations. They created as many problems as they solved”.  
With the growing realization that the social fabric was under 
increasing strain and the acknowledgement that market exchanges are 
only one type of governance mode (Edgar, 2001; Funnell, 2001), there 
was a perceived need to restore the confidence of the citizenry in 
government.   Around the world this decline in policy and service 
coherence has led to the adoption of networks by government and 
others as an alternative mode of governance with its associated 
mediating institutions and processes. The approach was widely 
portrayed as the “new” answer (Börzel, 1998; Gibson & Cameron, 
2001). Davis and Rhodes (2000, p. 95) encapsulated this view,  
Marketization may have introduced the private 
sector and price and quality competition to 
delivering public services, but it also fragmented 
the institutional structure of the public sector. 
Networks put it back together again. 
 
The following section outlines the concept of network governance and 
examines in detail the different operational logic and dimensions of 
this mode.    
NETWORK GOVERNANCE: RATIONALE AND DIFFERENT 
OPERATING LOGIC  
While the market and state governance modes are more well-
known, the network governance mode is a relatively new 
concept in its emergent, official   application. In networks, the 
emphasis is on a horizontal rather than a vertical organizing 
principle.  That is, within the network mode, one organization 
does not have a superior-subordinate relationship with another 
(O’Toole, 1997).  Instead there is considered to be a more 
collegiate or egalitarian approach to participation and decision 
making in which leadership arises and is shared around specific 
areas of expertise.   
Further, networks are flexible in that they allow actors from a 
range of sectors to form and reform into action arenas to 
respond to existing and emergent issues (Agranoff & McGuire, 
2003; Kamensky & Burlin, 2004; Mandell, 2001; Mandell & 
Steelman, 2003). Thus, networks can be comprised of a number 
of organizations and individuals representing a spectrum of 
different sectors. It is this unique coming together of people, 
resources that provides much of the advantage of the network 
mode. That is, through the interactions of diverse people and 
perspectives, novel and more responsive solutions to previously 
intractable social and public problems can be generated.   In 
addition, far from being one dimensional,  networked 
arrangements are based on varying degrees of independence and 
relationships as well as levels of operation, allowing for a 
variety of purposes to be accommodated and addressed 
(Considine, 2002; Brown & Keast, 2003; Mandell & Steelman, 
2003; Agranoff, 2003).  Increasingly governments are looking 
to capitalize on the inherently multiplex and malleable qualities 
of networks as a way of enhancing a wide array of 
responsibilities including policy development and 
implementation, the development of innovative responses, 
technologies and practices and achieving integrated service 
outcomes.  In short, the application of networks and associated 
network governance arrangements is considered the new way 
forward within a complex climate.  
Limitations of network governance 
However, the wholesale application of network governance as the 
solution to social and economic problems has been challenged by a 
number of theorists (Gibson & Cameron, 2001; Jessop, 1998). Just as 
the state and market modes have been proven to have their limitations 
so too does the network mode.  Networks often lack the accountability 
mechanisms available to the state, they are difficult to steer or control, 
they are difficult to get agreements on outcomes and actions to be 
taken, and they can be difficult to understand and determine who is 
“in charge” (Keast & Brown, 2002;  Rhodes, 1997; Taylor & Hodgett, 
1994). 
Consequently, in view of these considerations, many of these new 
network based initiatives, while remaining based in a “network 
governance” mode, are widening their options through the strategic 
application of aspects of the market and state modes (Lowndes & 
Skelcher, 1998).  
One such example of a deliberative effort to interplay governance 
modes to enhance outcomes centres on the Chief Executive Officers 
of Government Committee of government departments, which was 
formed around the mix of state, hierarchical and network, 
interpersonal relational components and processes. The emphasis of 
this group was on developing a coherent policy and service framework 
to foster a whole-of-government approach to human service delivery 
(O’Farrell, 2002) . Initial arrangements based solely on the 
hierarchical and subsequently on informal network relations proved to 
be insufficient mechanisms to make the necessary adjustments to 
working to achieve this goal.  In response, an approach that mixed 
horizontal relationship building, characterised by informal meetings, 
increased information sharing and joint projects, with a formalised, 
structured and vertically aligned approach, underpinned by routine 
schedules, planned agendas and ordered meetings, was implemented. 
Coupling the informal relational aspects of the network mode with the 
more formalised and mandated processes of the hierarchy, provided 
the additional  leverage necessary for the project to achieve the 
changes sought.   The result of this strategic mix, was the achievement 
of some cross-cutting initiatives that moved beyond narrow sectional 
interests and outcomes to produce broader gains for the whole public 
sector that had not been previously possible through conventional 
modes of operation (Keast, 2004). 
In this way it can be seen that the potential to move between 
governance modes provides an expanded terrain from which decision 
makers can design effective policy and program responses. Duclaud-
Williams (1993, p. 239) explains the rationale behind this approach, 
It could be argued that there are certain 
disadvantages to applying only one of the modes. 
Each mode has its blind spots as well as its strong 
points. Thus, it is only natural to draw from the 
other modes to improve the functioning of the 
mode in question. An organization characterized 
by all modes of governance can be expected to be 
sensitive to a diversity of societal demands. 
 
The notion of selecting between governance mode is not new. Indeed, 
the policies of many western countries have been bound up in a 
continuous oscillation between state intervention, community and 
network governance arrangements and contractual market exchanges 
(Brown & Keast, 2005). However, earlier versions were based on an 
understanding of the three domains being static, or in a stable, 
constant balance.  Following Polanyi (1957) a number of theorists 
including Offe (1996) and Coghill (2001) have depicted the three 
modes as forming a triangular relationship which requires a balance of 
each to achieve a “good society”. More recent conceptualisations of 
the shifting interface between governance modes portray an approach 
based on the judicious selection and mixing between these modes, 
strategically drawing upon their components and associated 
arrangements to achieve optimal outcomes.  
The potential for mixing and remixing of governance modes and their 
associated components is the enabling of a more adaptive and flexible 
response to changing environmental contexts and, as such, enhanced 
public policy development and implementation. However, 
unmanaged, this expansion of modes and mechanisms can also 
contribute to a more crowded, complex and contested policy arena.  
The various elements of the crowded policy domain have to be 
isolated, selected, configured, monitored and reconfigured  in order to 
achieve cohesive, effective public service outcomes. As well as 
selecting between modes, there is also the need to carefully monitor 
and remove the negative or mediating effects of prior interventions. 
Although the expansion of the governance mix has provided a broader 
set of options, as Brown and Keast (2003) forecast the plethora of 
options creates difficulties in choosing the right mix. The central 
challenge for cooperative strategy lies in the managing the intersection 
of different governance modes. As Rhodes (1997, p. V11) succinctly 
stated on this revised approach to governance: “It’s the mix that 
matters”.  
Since to some extent the prevailing contextual environment is 
expected to be characterized by the concurrent existence of all three 
modes (state, market and networks), although in differing degrees of 
intensity and at differing stages in the operational life cycle, a primary 
challenge becomes the task of selecting and managing the mix and 
intersection of these different modes of governance. However, while 
clearly within the present policy domain there is an understanding of 
the need for interface and interplay between governance modes, little 
has been provided by way of prescription for optimal application.   
UNDERSTANDING THE TOTAL FRAMEWORK 
It is argued that a possible solution to the problems of crowded policy 
domains relies on a better understanding of the operational models 
that underpin the three governance modes. These models highlight the 
optimal structures, integrating mechanisms, relationships and 
institutional arrangements of each of the modes. Through this 
understanding, policy and decision-makers are able to better mix and 
match the various components of each allowing for flexible and 
adaptive responses to intractable and complex public problems. In 
doing so, this process promotes selectivity and creates the space to 
better manage the policy and decision-making arena, in effect, 
“uncrowding” or decongesting the policy domain.   
Table 1 presents a framework which provides a starting point in which 
decision-makers and policy framers can understand the totality of the 
possible range of choices available to draw upon  for designing 
innovative governance approaches. It covers the three governance 
modes, state, market and network, setting out the optimal outcomes 
for utilization as well as delineating the operational models that 
underpin each mode . For each mode there are specific structural 
arrangements (public organizations, private organizations and 
collective organizations) that establishes the terms for the 
relationships among the actors.  In the state mode, hierarchical 
relationships govern the behaviour while contractual relationships 
govern the behaviour within markets and social/communal 
relationships govern the behaviour within networks.   
Different integrating mechanisms are used to link actions to outcomes 
within each mode.  The integrating mechanisms for the state mode are 
legal authority, formal rules and regulations, procedures, policies and 
mandates. Generally, these mechanism are based on the idea of 
command and control techniques. The integrating mechanisms for the 
market mode are arms length, contractual transactions and are based 
on concepts of supply and demand.  Social exchanges comprise the 
integrating mechanisms for networks. These exchanges are largely 
voluntary and are based on the idea of building trust and reciprocity.   
Finally, each of these governance modes will result in different 
institutional arrangements that allow for the operationalization of the 
relationships, designed to produce desirable outcomes.  For the state 
the emphasis is on the establishment of regulations, mandates, 
policies, procedures and legislation implemented through different 
organizational agencies and/or departments that will drive actions 
taken.  For the market, the emphasis is on the establishment of 
mergers, alliances, partnerships, acquisitions and other structural 
forms that bring independent actors together. With respect to networks 
the emphasis is on moulding the various strengths of interpersonal 
relationships, into collective action through mechanisms such as 
compacts, negotiation tables and collaborations which have a stronger 
social orientation.  
 
(Put Table 1 here) 
 
The contribution of the framework set out in the table is that by 
outlining the governance modes and their associated arrangements and 
processes, it expands the terrain of available options from which 
decisions can be made. To explain, if the goal is to secure a level of 
certainty around responsive policy development and service delivery 
then the interplay of network relational governance aspects with state, 
hierarchical elements of planning and scheduling will be a useful 
strategy. However, if efficiency is a key outcome, then relational 
aspects can be coupled with market based arrangements such as 
brokerage mechanisms to fast track endeavours.  
This approach enables a more considered selection of governance 
modes and matching to desired outcomes/situations. The result is a 
more adaptive and flexible response to changing environmental 
contexts and, as such, enhanced public policy development and 
implementation.  
Given that government has been a primary architect of many of these 
arrangements and because of its ultimate responsibility for the good 
order of society, the role of selecting and matching will often fall to 
government and in particular the central agencies of government. It is 
appropriate that government takes on this role as a logical extension of 
their traditional coordination role, for if the domain within which 
decision-making becomes fragmented with numerous actors crowding  
and contested, useful outcomes are unlikely to be realised. 
THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE 
CROWDED POLICY DOMAIN 
In undertaking a central role in the mixing and matching of 
governance modes,  government will have to weigh the costs involved 
in selecting one mode over another.  For instance, market mechanisms 
will often result in short term benefits that will be highly visible.  Over 
the long term, however, these benefits may not be enough.  In order to 
capitalize on these short term benefits, government may need to get 
involved with state interventions to coordinate unrelated market 
efforts in order to sustain these efforts over the long term.  Finally, the 
coordination of existing programs may be insufficient to solve the 
more complex, intractable public problems and more innovative forms 
of collaborative efforts may need to come to the fore.   
Although as government moves from one mode to another, short term 
benefits can become long term benefits, the efforts will also take more 
time and effort and will be more complicated in terms of number of 
actors involved, possible interactions, institutional arrangements and 
strategies needed.   In effect, this will mean that government will be 
moving from efforts involving low risks to those involving high risks.  
Although governments may want to capitalize on these long term 
benefits, therefore, there may be barriers or constraints that will limit 
their ability to do so. 
Barriers and constraints 
 Mandell and Steelman (2003) have indicated a number of these 
different barriers and constraints and their impact on the type of 
strategies that are most appropriate for governments in deciding on the 
type of mode that would be most effective.  Although there can be 
many such constraints, a number of key ones which relate to the 
changing roles of government are worth noting here.  They relate to 
the need for: formulating new rules; changing cultures; dealing with 
the existing political/power structures; and the mesh between 
participation and accountability. 
Although governments are very familiar and comfortable with the 
need to formulate and implement rules to guide performance in the 
state and market modes, they may not be as familiar and comfortable 
with those that are needed in the network modes (Keast & Brown, 
2002).  Kickert et al. (1997) discuss the difference between formal and 
informal rules in network governance.  Formal rules are those that 
officially guide the efforts of government to work through networked 
arrangements.  Informal rules, however, are those that arise out of the 
interactions of the actors as they learn to trust and better understand 
each other.  Government has to be aware that these informal rules may 
often take precedence over the more formal rules and to learn the 
importance of allowing these informal rules to stand alongside of and 
to guide the intricate interactions that are needed to maintain 
networked arrangements.   Although the literature on intra-
organizational relations discusses the impact of informal rules, within 
a network the emphasis needs to not only recognize this phenomenon, 
but also on developing trust within the network in order to capitalize 
on these informal rules (Mandell & Steelman, 2003). 
Culture changes refer to the need to understand the impact of values, 
attitudes and perceptions on the different modes available to 
government.   Each mode is grounded in different moral orders and 
rationales that guide the behavior of participants.  For the state mode, 
it is the reliance on maintaining order through the legitimate authority 
vested in the hierarchy.  For the market, there is a reliance on 
contracts and agreements to guide exchanges.  For networks it is the 
shared values and trust built up among the participants. The difficulty 
is that although these moral orders and rationales are well understood 
and accepted in the state and market mode, they are not as well 
understood, nor accepted, when acted out and/or applied in the 
network governance mode.  Participants must work on building trust 
and accepting the different perceptions, values and attitudes of the 
diverse members of the network. Government’s role, therefore, is to 
ensure that a foundation is laid down in which this can take place and 
then to let these arrangements take their course. 
Governments are very astute in understanding the need to pay 
attention to their surrounding political/power structures.  This is 
particularly important when moving from one mode to another.  Many 
of the existing political/power structures are well attuned to giving 
their support to the state and market modes. The network governance 
mode, however, often is seen as a threat to their very power base.  
Governments must therefore not lose sight of the need to endow those 
responsible for the governance architecture with sufficient and 
ongoing legitimate support and backing to select and implement the 
modes that are  most appropriate. 
Finally, the move to allow for more participation by actors outside of 
government must be tempered with the need for government to 
maintain accountability and responsiveness.  As has been indicated, 
no one mode holds all the answers.  Government’s role, therefore, is 
to ensure that regardless of the mode selected,  there is a recognition 
of the role of protecting the public trust and being accountable for 
actions to the public.  Being able to select different modes of 
governance does not change this critical role for government, it only 
makes it more complicated to maintain. 
Despite the fact that governments are increasingly taking on this 
additional role, there is a lack of role clarity and ambiguity in relation 
to authority sources and lines of responsibility therefore, there may be 
a tendency to revert to the more conventional roles (Keast & Brown, 
2002). Mixing and matching presents some contradictions to the 
traditional authoritative functions of government and, as such, there is 
a need to remain alert to any tendency to drift back to more customary 
roles, without recourse to implementing the more complex 
collaborative and participative relations and associated network 
governance arrangements.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The failures of state intervention and the negative impacts of market-
based rationalities have created the space for the re-emergence of 
network based ideals and governance patterns.  The evidence of 
contemporary public sector operation points to a continued and 
perhaps increased practice of hybrid institutional and governance 
forms in which the three-way oscillation between state, market and 
network modes have been extended to include arrangements that may 
contain a mix of all three. The residual traces of failed or stalled 
policy stances and the intermingling of governance modes have 
produced a crowded policy domain that is argued to prevent coherent 
and effective policy and decision-making to occur. This paper has 
posited that aligning the governance mode and the type of 
relationships along with recognizing and identifying the different 
dimensions on which these modes may differ is a crucial step to 
implementing successful policy and service delivery outcomes.  
Specifically, it has been argued that in order to capitalise on the mix of 
governance modes, it is necessary to be able to make appropriate 
selections, configure the arrangements and monitor the outcomes.  
The task of managing the resultant crowded policy domain has fallen 
to government.  Although government may be well placed to 
undertake this role, the traditional skill base and culture will need to 
be extended to embrace a non-traditional governance approach. 
Although a difficult undertaking at best, it is not an impossible one. 
More importantly for governments to realize, it is one whose time has 
come. 
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TABLE 1: UNDERPINNING MODELS OF THE THREE 
GOVERNANCE MODES 
 
GOVERNANCE 
MODES 
 
State 
 
Market 
 
Network 
 
OUTCOME 
FOCUS 
Certainty  Efficiency  Reflexivity  
STRUCTURAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
Public 
Organizations 
Private 
Organizations 
Collective/Communal  
Organizations 
RELATIONSHIPS 
 
Hierarchical 
Dependent  
Contractual 
Independent 
Social/Communal 
Interdependent 
INTEGRATING 
MECHANISM 
Legal 
Authority  
Formal rules  
Regulations 
Mandates 
Procedures 
Policies 
 
Arms length 
Contractual 
transactions 
Price 
Supply & 
demand 
Social exchange  
Common vision 
Trust 
Reciprocity 
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
Departments 
Committees 
Task Forces 
 
 
Partnerships 
Mergers 
Alliances 
Acquisitions 
Compacts 
Accords 
Negotiation tables 
Informal networking  
 
ISSUE 
COMPLEXITY 
Routine Intermediate 
Complexity 
Complex 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
  
To Polity & 
Public  
To Self  - 
Board  
To Group - Internal   
